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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah

RONALD BRADSHAW,
Plaintiff and

Respondent,

vs.
W A L T E R W . K E R S H A W and H E L E N G.
K E R S H A W , his wife, W I L L A R D B.
R O G E R S , E D W A R D B. R O G E R S , and
ROCKEFELLER LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

\ Case No.
( 13502

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Willard B. Rogers, Edward B. Rogers
and Rockefeller Land & Livestock Co.

N A T U R E O F CASE
Action by respondent (plaintiff Bradshaw) for
suit to quiet title and for specific performance by virtue of an alleged option to purchase real property and
well permit; counterclaim by appellant (defendant
below) Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company for
quiet title to said property and cross claim by Rocke1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

feller Land and Livestock Company against defendants,
Walter W . Kershaw and Helen G. Kershaw for damages on warranties of title should their counterclaim
for quiet title be denied.

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN L O W E R COURT
The lower court denied jury trial in quiet title
action. It then ruled that the option for purchase of the
property (which option was assigned to plaintiff Bradshaw) was valid. I t denies the counterclaim of defendant, Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company, for
quiet title; denied said appellant's cross claim against
Kershaw and ordered defendant, Kershaw, to convey
property he did not own and to which he could not obtain
title to plaintiff, Bradshaw.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment below
which declared the option on the property valid, and
seek a decision by the Supreme Court directing the lower
court to enter judgment in favor of appellant, Rockefeller, on its counterclaim to quiet title on the 560 acres
of land and the well permit, of a judgment against
defendant Kershaw for $42,400.00 damages under the
warranties of conveyances by Kershaw to appellant,
Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company. If this be
denied, then, as the counterclaim for quiet title is an
action at law, reversal and trial by jury on the quiet
2
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title action, trial by jury concerning the facts whether
or not the option is a valid option and in the issue of
damages against Kershaw.

S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS
1. THE

PROPERTY.

This brief is submitted by appellants, Rockefeller
Land & Livestock Company, Willard Rogers and Edward Rogers. Willard B. Rogers is the principal owner
of Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company and said
appellant's interest is not at variance, and therefore for
convenience these two appellants will sometimes be
referred to as "Rogers". Edward B. Rogers has no involvement in this suit and should be dismissed therefrom.
This action involves three tracts of land and a well
permit. Rogers seek to quiet title to (two) tracts of land
and to clarify title to the well permit. The third tract of
land (the Kimball ranch) is important to the consideration of this action, but its title is not in dispute.
(1) The main dispute concerns 480 acres contained
in the Staples escrow. In regard thereto in 1966 Grant
and Grace Staples sold this 480 acres tract together
with other real and personal property to Marion Kesler
and others for $39,560.00 by written agreement entitled
E S C R O W A G R E E M E N T which was admitted in
this action as Exhibit P-2. Kershaw purchased this
escrow and sold this 480 acres by deed and warranties
to Rogers subject to escrow with balance due thereon
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of about $26,000.00. See Exhibits P-2, P-3, D-7 and
D-9. Rogers paid Kershaw $5,000.00, assumed the
debts and has paid to date $6,600 to the bank in Richfield on the option balance.
(2) Second tract of land is an 80 acre tract contiguous to the above 480 acres but not a part thereof, it
being owned by Grant and Grace Staples and its title
being involved in a separate probate proceedings and
not available to Kershaw. (Tr. 152, 298).
(3) The well permit concerns a six second-foot well
permit previously owned by Milo and Boyd Watts who
sold to Kershaw, who conveyed to Rogers. This well
permit is not a part of the above escrow and was authorized, expended and used on the Kimball ranch. (Tr.
255,256).
(4) The Kimball Ranch, which is a 985 acre ranch
contiguous to the aforesaid 480 acres is not involved in
this suit.
2. T H E O P T I O N (Exhibit P-4).
On or about July 20, 1970 Milton A. Christensen,
the agent, confidant and fiduciary of Walter Kershaw,
obtained from Kershaw a signature on an option, said
option at said time being in blank and said option having
been given for the sole purpose of attempting to assist
Milton A. Christensen in making an application for a
loan to the Farmer's Home Administration; its purpose
being to buy out Kershaw's interest in all his Millard
County properties including the property involved and
4
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described herein. (Tr. 152, 531). Christensen was hopelessly in debt to Kershaw and others, he having filed
bankruptcy and having listed debts in the approximate
amount of One Million Dollars and he having further
owed Walter Kershaw at said time debts in the sum of
approximately $150,000.00 (Tr. 196).
Kershaw testified that the option sued upon herein
was first presented to him on or about July 20, 1970,
and that at the time the option was presented to him the
option was blank (Tr. 511). H e testified that there was
no consideration for the option; that there was no name
or address placed thereon nor was there any county
designated; that the property was not described; that his
name, residence and the period for which the option
was to remain irrevocable was totally blank; that at the
date the option bears, August 8, 1970, he was absent
from the State of Utah. The purchase price for the land
involved 480 acres in the option) was purported $7,200.00. Kershaw testified that this also was placed in
the option without his consent and knowledge and without his authorization (Tr. 511, 514).
Kershaw further testified (and Christensen agrees)
that the only purpose of the option to Christensen was
so that Christensen could make application for a loan
with the United States Department of Agriculture
Farmer's Home Administration in order that he might
bring his debt arrearage current to Kershaw and purchase from Kershaw, Kershaw's interest in all of his
property in Millard County and assume all indebtedness thereon (Tr. 152, 531).

5
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3. T H E A G E N C Y
Christensen commenced to act as agent for Walter
W. Kershaw in 1968 and this relationship continued
through August of 1970 (Tr. 149, 151). In this regard
in 1968 Christensen purchased the Kimball Ranch for
and on behalf of Kershaw and said sale was consummated by the Kimball people to Kershaw in the Spring
of 1969 for a price of $130,000.00 and in connection
therewith, Christensen negotiated a loan with Prudential Life Insurance Company in excess of $100,000.00
(Tr. 142). This ranch was subsequently sold to Christensen for $150,000.00 and repossessed by Kershaw finally (Tr. 198). Christensen negotiated for and on behalf of Kershaw an interest in the Staples escrow (Tr.
144). This interest was conveyed to Kershaw in July,
1969, by bill of sale and assignment and a quiet claim
deed which were admitted as evidence and identified
herein as Exhibit P-3. On this date Kesler owned the
entire escrow. It is uncontradicted that Kershaw acquired all of Kesler's interest in the 480 acres.
With regard to the eighty (80) acres, Christensen
testified he negotiated the acquisition of this land for
Kershaw from Grant and Grace Staples for the sum
of $3,000.00. This title was involved in a probate proceedings in that Grant Staples was incompetant. Clear
title was not available (Tr. 152, 298). Christensen
subsequently as agent and confidant of Walter W .
Kershaw negotiated and acquired for him a well permit
which was designated in and expended by the drilling
of a well on the Kimball Ranch (142, 255, 457) and
the 80 acre tract.

6
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At the time the option was signed Christensen was
operating 560 acres as Kershaw's agent (Tr. 149,151).
Thereafter Christensen defaulted in his payments on
the Kimball Ranch to Kershaw and likewise the indebtedness of Kershaw to Prudential Insurance Company fell into arrears (Tr. 198, 523). Thereafter Christensen filed bankruptcy in May of 1970, and his interest in the Kimball Ranch came under the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, and defendant Walter
W . Kershaw was listed as a creditor on his schedules in
the sum of approximately $150,000.00 (Tr. 196). Irrespective of this Christensen continued to operate the
said 560 acre tract as agent and confidant of Kershaw.
Such is not disputed.
4. A C T U A L K N O W L E D G E B Y B R A D S H A W ON T H E SCOPE, P U R P O S E A N D
LIMITATIONS OF T H E OPTION.
Bradshaw knew (a) that the 480 acres was part of
Staples escrow and as such could not be conveyed, (b)
that 80 acres was involved in probate proceedings and
was subject to title limitations, and (c) that well had
been expended and drilled on Kimball Ranch (Tr. 218,
387). Bradshaw also knew that on or about December
1, 1970, Christensen purported to exercise the option,
but he tendered no money in exercise of the option (Ex.
P-7). Nor did he have any to tender. (Tr. 234, 274,
515). Christensen was in any event not "ready, able
and willing" to perform and even attempted to sell his
alleged option to Rogers for $2,500 in late December,
7
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1970 (Tr. 279). Kershaw then told Christensen (at
that time) that the option was invalid, was not filled
in as authorized, was given for the sole purpose of obtaining the farm loan and that as the farm loan was
not obtained he had sold the property to the Rogers
and the option was revoked (Tr. 516). Bradshaw was
further informed and was present in the latter part
of December, 1970 at a meeting held in the office of
Attorney Weston Bayles where all said parties were
present along with Rogers who had prior to said meeting
(December 17, 1970) purchased the property (Tr. ).
And again Bradshaw was acquainted with the limitations of the option and it was the subject of a heated
discussion. It was not until January 8, 1971 that Bradshaw, after this full knowledge and after the conveyance
from Kershaw to Rogers of December 17, 1970, purchased the option and decided to attempt to exercise the
option rights. ( S e e E x P - 5 ) .
Kershaw testified that from July 20,1970, the date
he signed it in blank, until December 2,1970, said option
was not seen by him. Then on December 2, 1970 it was
presented to him by Christensen and Attorney Weston
Bayles with the claim that they were exercising the said
option. Kershaw testified that he told Christensen and
Bayles that the option was a nullity, that Christensen
had violated his trust, that option was spent, that option
was not filled in as agreed, and that any right claimed
by virtue of said instrument had been revoked (Tr.
516). Christensen made no tender of money along with
his claimed exercise of the option (Ex. P-7), and had

8
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no money to tender and in fact tried to peddle the
so-called option to Rogers later in December for
$2,500. Ronald Bradshaw testified that at a meeting
held at the office of Weston Bayles in the latter part
of December he was advised of the sale by Kershaw to
Rogers of the properties involved in this action. Also,
that he purchased by an assignment of said option from
Christensen on or about January the 8th with full actual
knowledge of the claims of Rogers (Tr. 340) who had
purchased the property from Kershaw on December 17,
1970.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E OPTION WAS INVALID BECAUSE IT
W A S SOLD B Y C H R I S T E N S E N TO B R A D S H A W IN VIOLATION OF CHRISTENSEN'S
A G E N C Y ON U S E O F T H E O P T I O N A N D
W I T H F U L L K N O W L E D G E BY BRADS H A W OF T H E OPTION'S LIMITATIONS
AND T H A T T H E OPTION WAS SPENT AND
INVALID.
Christensen was Kershaw's agent in acquiring
properties in Millard County (including the 480 acre
tract and well permit). Kershaw wanted to sell out
his properties and Christesnen wanted the opportunity
to acquire them. (Tr. 152). In order for Christensen
to buy Kershaw out, Christensen would have to borrow funds from the United States Department of Ag-
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riculture Farm Home Administration. Therefore, Kershaw on the 21st or 22nd of July gave Christensen the
option for the sole purpose of obtaining such loan so
he could buy Kershaw's interests. In September, 1970,
the loan was turned down. Thereafter, on December
17, 1970, Kershaw by assignment of the Staples' escrow
rights and quit claim deeds sold the property involved
to Rogers. Bradshaw had full knowledge of the agency
relationship and the limitations on the option and that
Christensen had tendered no money and that Kershaw
had repudiated the option.
An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters
within the scope of his agency. 3 Am.Jur. 2d Agency,
Section 199 citing numerous authorities. And as Bradshaw had full knowledge of the agency and its limitation he had a duty to ascertain the extent of the
agent's authority and was bound by the limitation of
such authority. 3 Am.Jur. 2d Agency, Section 78 citing
hosts of authorities. I t is therefore clear that when
Bradshaw purchased the option from Christensen he
was bound by the limitations of the option namely an
option for the sole and only purpose of obtaining a
loan to finance Christensen's purchase of Kershaw's
holdings. The loan having been declined, the option
had no further validity. This was clearly Kershaw's
interpretation of the option for, as aforementioned, on
December 17, 1970, he sold the property involved to
Rogers. Bradshaw, therefore, took the property subject
to the conveyances of Kershaw to Rogers of December
17, 1970.
10
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The option itself is limited by its own terms to the
sole purpose of acquiring loans from the Farmers
Home Administration. In paragraph 2 thereof it states
as follows:
"This option is given to enable the Buyer to obtain a loan insured or made by the United States
of America, acting through the Farmers Home
Administration, United States Department of
Agriculture, and its duly authorized representatives, (hereinafter called the "Government"),
for the purchase of said property."
The following provision of said option, likewise, indicates that it was for the sole and limited purpose of
obtaining a government loan and was not a general
option. In paragraph 6 of said option it states:
"The seller further agrees to convey said property to the Buyer by general warranty deed . . .
in the form, manner and at the time required by
the Government, conveying to the Buyer a valid,
unencumbered, indefeasible fee-simple title to
said property meeting all requirements of the
Government..."
Christensen being the agent and confidant of Kershaw, Kershaw had the right to place his trust and confidence in his agent and it was Christensen's duty to
make a full disclosure to Kershaw of all material facts
pertaining to the transaction and to keep Kershaw fully
and completely informed and to make a full and complete disclosure of the entire transaction concerning the
option. This duty was amplified by reason of the fact
that he was personally profiting in his own behalf as

a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

well as representing the interest of Kershaw. In this
regard it is settled that one who undertakes to perform
a fiduciary duty and fails in it is not entitled to compensation. See Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390,
353 P.2d 989. Christensen by negotiating his loan on
behalf of himself and Kershaw was legally obligated
not only to make a full disclosure of all pertinent facts
to Kershaw, but he was required to represent the contracting parties interest in good faith and to give the
benefit of the bargain obtained on the sale to his principal. There can be no doubt that Christensen violated
his duty as a confidant with respect to his duties and
obligations to the principal and that he should not be
permitted to profit from his gross violation as his fiduciary relationship. At page 398 of the Moreton case it
states:
"Moreton was negotiating the sale of the claims
on behalf of himself and the Hollands. This
obliged him not only to make a full disclosure of
all pertinent facts to them, but to represent their
interests in good faith and to give them the benefit of the bargain obtained on the sale."
In the present case, Christensen admitted that he
was acting on behalf of Kershaw and for his benefit
in obtaining the loan and thus as in the Moreton case,
Christensen was acting for himself and also for Kershaw, and as his agent he must act in good faith and
give Kershaw the benefit of the bargain. Rather than
doing this, Christensen has taken advantage of Kershaw, has taken this property from him without paying him one cent for his equity and has left him ob12
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ligated to convey by warranty deed the property to
which he does not even have the legal title and cannot
get till he pays some $23,000.00 on the Staples escrow.
It should further be noted, that Christensen admitted that he drafted the option to purchase real
property, Exhibit P-4. (Tr. 226) And although it is
axiomatic that the intent of the parties to the said
document is controlling, in the event of any ambiguity,
it must be construed against him and the lower court
ignored that rule as it applies to Exhibit P-4. As
stated above, the purpose of said option was to enable
the buyer to obtain a loan insured or made by the
United States of America to buy out all of Kershaw's
property. If that means what it says, then when the
loan was denied the purpose of the option was accomplished and it terminated. If there is any ambiguity
as to the intent of the parties, regarding the purpose of
the option, then that ambiguity must be resolved
against Christensen who drafted the document, and if
he had intended this to be a general option available to
him for any purpose, then as the party drafting the
document he could have easily so provided but he did
not do so.
POINT II

BRADSHAW PURCHASED THE PROPERTY
SUBJECT TO KERSHAW'S CONVEYANCES
TO ROGERS AS SAID CONVEYANCES TO
ROGERS W E R E RECORDED PRIOR TO THE
RECORDING OF THE OPTION.
13
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The assignments of the Staples escrow specificallydescribing the properties and the quit claim deeds from
Kershaw to Rogers were recorded December 22, 1970.
The option from Kershaw to Christensen was recorded
December 23, 1970. Consequently, under Utah Code
Sec. 57-1-6 Bradshaw was charged with notice that the
property herein involved had been conveyed by Kershaw to Rogers on December 17, 1970. As noted above,
Bradshaw did not purchase the option from Christensen until January 8, 1971. Therefore, under said Utah
Code Sec. 57-1-6 he purchased with full knowledge of
the conveyances of Kershaws to Rogers of December
17, 1970, and purchased subject to these conveyances.
As mentioned in the statement of facts, supra, the
conveyances from Kershaw consisted of all assignments
of all rights under the Staples escrow which included
the 480 acres here involved. Rogers purchased and
bought these properties involved in this action from
Kershaw for $5,000.00 subject to the obligations of the
Staples escrow which was at that time some $26,000.00.
Therefore, by force of the recording statutes alone,
any interest Bradshaw obtained from the option was
subject to Kershaw's conveyances to Rogers of December 17, 1970. It should further be observed that the
purported option was never entitled to be recorded in
any event, never having been acknowledged (See Ex.
P-4).

14
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POINT III
T H E COURT E R R E D IN D I S C H A R G I N G
T H E J U R Y A F T E R T H R E E AND ONEH A L F DAYS OF TRIAL.
For 3 and y% days this action was tried as a jurycase. Then before these appellants began their case
in chief, the court dismissed the jury over their objections. Rogers was entitled to have the issues of fact
as they affected their claim for quiet title tried by a
jury, to-wit:
(1) Whether or not any consideration of $100.00
was ever paid;
(2) Whether or not at the time Kershaw signed
the option it was in blank;
(3) Was option revoked; possession; and notice.
(4) The jury should have been given the issue as
to what, if anything, was said between Kershaw and
Christensen as to the property to be included in the
option and what, if anything, was said with regard to
the purchase price to be paid; also, the proper date,
time, price, and purpose including whether or not said
option was a single purpose document fully spent prior
to so-called acceptance. The issues in this action were
essentially factual issues to be resolved by a jury.
It has long been the rule that quiet title actions
are legal actions subject to trial by jury. See Holland
v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 Pac 2nd 250 in which
it was held that parties are entitled as a matter of right
15
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to a jury trial. And the Court therein interpreted Sec
78-21-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as so providing.
It says:
"Right to Jury Trial. — In actions where the
recovery of specific real or personal property,
with or without damages . . . an issue of fact
may be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is
waived. . ."
In the Holland case, the Court stated at page 13:
"This Court has already held that an action to
quiet title is an action at law and either side upon
request is entitled to a jury trial."
And again the Court stated at page 14 as follows:
"It is our opinion that the above language, if
given reasonable and rational construction, must
be interpreted as declaring that all issues of fact
relating to possession and rights of possession of
specific real or personal property may be determined by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived . . .
we are of the opinion that where the question is
presented as to the right to possession, the right
to a jury trial is guaranteed."
In the Holland case, the Court likewise relied on Rule
39, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as supporting the
right to a jury trial in such cases. Also see Valley
Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 119 Utah 204, 225 P . 2d 739.
P O I N T IV
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D IN G R A N T I N G
S P E C I F I C P E R F O R M A N C E I N T H I S ACTION.
16
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The trial Court not only violated the cardinal right
of the defendant Rogers to have his issues tried by
jury, but granted specific performance in direct violation of all the established cardinal rules as follows:
(a) Specific performance cannot be required unless all terms of the agreement are clear.
(b) The court cannot compel the specific performance of a contract which the parties did not mutually
agree upon.
(c) The contract must be free from doubt, fair
and equitable; free from fraud, surprise, mistake and
hardship.
(d) The contract must be free from vagueness
and ambiguity and leave nothing to conjecture or to be
supplied by the court.
(e) It must be sufficiently certain and definite in
its terms to leave no reasonable doubt as to what the
parties intended, and no reasonable doubt of the specific thing equity is called upon to perform, and it must
be sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the court
may enforce it as actually made by the parties.
(f) A greater degree of certainty is required for
specific performance in equity than is necessary to
establish a contract as the basis of the action at law for
damages.
See Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 U 2d. 368, 423 P.2d
491.
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I t cannot be denied that the option in dispute was
replete with questions of fact, i.e. (a) the date, (b)
consideration, (c) property, (d) purchase price, (e)
date it became revocable, (f) no tender of acceptance.
All of these items certainly barred specific performance
under the Pitcher v. Lauritzen, case Supra.
How the Court could deny Rogers this right to
trial by jury on the foregoing questions of fact and on
the expressed warranties and the breach thereof, and
require forfeiture of his $5,000.00 consideration plus
$6,600.00 paid on the escrow and $2,850.00 paid on
the 80 acres, and require him to forfeit these amounts
without any setoffs or remuneration; and, at the same
grant Bradshaw specific performance of 480 acres of
land which was tied up in an escrow and which had an
indebtedness thereon of $26,000.00; and further to grant
specific performance of 80 acres of land which is tied
up in a probate proceeding and further to grant specific performance of a well which had already been expended all of which was known to Bradshaw results
in a very strange conclusion as far as the laws of the
State of Utah are concerned; it also results in an unjust
and inequitable judgment as far as Rogers is concerned.
The Court should further note that Helen G. Kershaw did not sign the option and in spite of this the
trial Court had ordered and directed specific performance of the above-described properties, and at the same
time Helen G. Kershaw did sign all the deeds and warrantees which conveyed all of her right, title, and in18
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terest to the Rogers and these express warranties and
conveyances to the Rogers were ignored by the Court.
The judgment of the lower court purports to quiet
the title to the property involved in this action as to
the interest held by Walter W. Kershaw and also as
to the interest held by Helen G. Kershaw, and the
court cannot decree specific performance against Kershaw for the reasons hereinabove stated and cannot
decree specific performance against Helen G. Kershaw
either as she never signed the said option.
As hereinabove stated, under the evidence in this
action the court must be able to find that there is no
reasonable doubt as to what the parties intended, and
under the evidence it could not and did not. The court
could not even find such by clear and convincing evidence, and did not purport to do so. The court only
purported to make its findings based upon a preponderance of the evidence (See paragraph 6 of the lower
court's memorandum decision.) The court cannot decree specific performance based only upon a preponderance of the evidence.

POINT V
S H O U L D T H E COURT NOT Q U I E T T I T L E
IN ROCKERFELLER LAND AND LIVESTOCK C O M P A N Y , T H E N T H E C O U R T
S H O U L D A W A R D D A M A G E S TO R O C K E R F E L L E R A G A I N S T K E R S H A W ON T H E
WARRANTIES.
19
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The Court erred in dismissing said appellant's
Cross Claim against Kershaw. In this regard, the appellant's Cross Claim against Kershaw for Breach of
Contract is based upon the warranties which he had
extended in his conveyances to appellants. Defendants'
Exhibit #D-7-D-9 were signed by Walter W . Kershaw
and Helen G. Kershaw, and contain this language
(page 1 of E x . D - 7 ) :
"The assignor warrants that he has succeeded to
all of the rights, claims and interests of the other
buyers named in said escrow agreement and now
stands in the position of being the sole buyer
therein and in and to the properties covered
thereby, and that he is sole and only owner of
said escrow agreement insofar as the rights of the
buyers therein are concerned and has full power,
right and authority to make, execute, and deliver
the instant assignment."
If the option was valid, then Kershaw has breached
his warranty agreement to convey good title to said
properties to the Rogers. The damages sustained by
the Rogers, in that event was $42,500.00. The trial
Court completely disregarded the expressed warranties
set forth above, which were solomnly agreed to by Kershaws and Rogers and K N O W I N G L Y executed and
granted by Kershaws some 17 days after the confrontation with Christensen concerning the alleged option.
In the light of the undisputed testimony of Maurice
Harding as to the value of the land ($65.00 per acre
for the 560 acres) and of Bradshaw as to the value of
the well permit ($6000) the trial court clearly erred
in holding that there was no proof of damages to Rock-
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erfeller Land & Livestock Co., when it failed to get its
bargain under said conveyances. (Tr. 486, 451).
CONCLUSION
I t is respectfully urged that this Court hold that
the option sued upon herein was a void, spent, and revoked option, that Rogers (Rockerfeller) is entitled to
recover on its deeds and warranties, that the Court
erred in depriving Rogers of his right to have the jury
render a verdict after it had sat on the case for nearly
four days.
Respectfully submitted,
R O B E R T C. C U M M I N G S
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON
M A R K S. M I N E R
Attorneys for Appellants,
Rockerfeller Land & Livestock Co.,
Edward B. Rogers
Willard B. Rogers
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